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Abstract   
We investigate the dynamics of prices, information and expectations in a competitive, noisy, dynamic asset 
pricing equilibrium model. We look at the bias of prices as estimators of fundamental value in relation to traders' 
average expectations and note that prices are more (less) biased than average expectations if and only if traders 
over- (under-) rely on public information with respect to optimal statistical weights. We find that prices are biased 
in relation to average expectations whenever traders speculate on short-run price move- ments. In a market with 
long term traders, over-reliance on public information obtains if noise trade increments are correlated enough 
and/or there is low enough residual uncertainty in the payoff. This defines a “Keynesian” region; the 
complementary region is “Hayekian” in that prices are less biased than average expectations in the estimation of 
fundamental value. The standard case of no residual uncertainty and noise trading following a random walk is on 
the frontier of the two regions. With short-term traders there typically are two equilibria, with the stable (unstable) 
one displaying over- (under-) reliance on public information. 
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  1 Introduction
Do investors excessively focus their attention on market aggregate behavior and public
information, disregarding their private judgement? Are asset prices aligned with
the consensus opinion (average expectations) on the fundamentals in the market?
Undeniably, the issues above have generated much debate among economists. In his
General Theory, Keynes pioneered the vision of stock markets as beauty contests
where investors try to guess not the fundamental value of an asset but the average
opinion of other investors, and end up chasing the crowd.1 This view tends to portray
a stock market dominated by herding, behavioral biases, fads, booms and crashes
(see, for example, Shiller (2000)), and goes against the tradition of considering market
prices as aggregators of the dispersed information in the economy advocated by Hayek
(1945). According to the latter view prices reect, perhaps noisily, the collective
information that each trader has about the fundamental value of the asset (see, for
example, Grossman (1989)), and provide a reliable signal about assets' liquidation
values. In this paper, we address the tension between the Keynesian and the Hayekian
visions in a dynamic nite horizon market where investors, except for noise traders,
have no behavioral bias and hold a common prior on the liquidation value of the risky
asset.
In a dynamic market with risk averse short-term traders, dierential information,
and an independent stock of noisy supply across periods Allen, Morris, and Shin
(2006) argue that prices are always farther away from fundamentals than traders'
average expectations and display over-reliance on public information. In this case
asset prices depend on investors' higher order beliefs (i.e. the average expectation
at period n of the average expectation at n + 1 of ...of the average expectation of
the liquidation value in the nal period) and systematically depart from fundamentals
compared to investors' average expectations. The reason is that in a dynamic market,
when traders try to predict their peers' actions, the price heavily weights public
information, more than what the optimal statistical weight prescribes to assess the
1Keynes' vision of the stock market as a beauty contest or the situation in which judges are more
concerned about the opinion of other judges than of the intrinsic merits of the participants in the
contest: \...professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the
competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being
awarded to the Competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the
competitor as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself nds
prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom
are looking at the problem from the same point of view." (Keynes, General Theory, 1936).
2fundamentals, ultimately supporting Keynes' vision of the stock market. The question
is thus how general is this nding or whether Keynes always prevail over Hayek. Is it
always true that prices are more biased than average expectations in the estimation
of fundamentals? Is there always over-reliance on public information?2
The central result of this paper is that both the bias of prices in relation to av-
erage expectations in the estimation of fundamentals as well as the potential over-
or under-reliance on public information are driven by traders' short-term speculative
behavior. In a static market agents speculate on the dierence between the price and
the liquidation value, prices are aligned with investors' average expectations about
this value, and traders put the optimal statistical weight on public information. In
a dynamic market, in principle traders with a long or a short horizon also specu-
late on short-run price dierences. This may misalign prices and investors' average
expectations, potentially leading to over- or under-reliance on public information.
Allowing for a general noise trading process and assuming that residual uncertainty
can aect the liquidation value, the following results obtain. When traders have a long
horizon short-run speculation is driven by the correlation of noise trade increments
and by the potential presence of residual uncertainty in the liquidation value. In
the benchmark case with no residual uncertainty aecting the liquidation value, and
noise trading following a random walk (i.e. with independent noise trade increments),
prices assign the optimal statistical weight to public information and equal the average
expectations of investors about the fundamental value plus a risk-weighted noise term.
In this case traders act as in a static market in every period and the bias of prices and
average expectations in the estimation of the fundamental value is the same. When
residual pay-o uncertainty and noise trade predictability are added, traders also
speculate on short-run price dierences, and either over- or under-reliance on public
information may occur. Low residual uncertainty and high correlation in noise trading
increments tend to generate over-reliance; conversely, high residual uncertainty and
low correlation in noise trade increments tend to generate under-reliance on public
information. This partitions the parameter space into a Keynesian region, where
prices are farther away from fundamentals than average expectations, and a Hayekian
region where the opposite occurs. The partition depends on risk tolerance and more
risk aversion enlarges the Keynesian region.3
2Over-reliance on public information may have deleterious welfare consequences (see, e.g., Vives
(1997), Morris and Shin (2002), and Angeletos and Pavan (2007)). In this paper we stay within the
bounds of a positive analysis.
3It is worth noting that it should be no surprise that in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium
3With short-term traders there typically are two equilibria ranked by traders' re-
sponsiveness to private information. In the equilibrium with low (high) signal re-
sponsiveness there is over- (under-) reliance on public information. Again, the rst
equilibrium may be associated to Keynes and the second one to Hayek. Furthermore,
in the former (latter) equilibrium the price adjusts slower (faster) to changes in the
fundamentals than the consensus expectations of investors. The \Hayekian" equi-
librium is, however, unstable. Finally, if noise trading follows a random walk and
there is suciently large residual uncertainty in the liquidation value, over-reliance
on public information always occurs in equilibrium.
The intuition for our results is as follows. In a dynamic market the relationship
between price and fundamentals depends both on the quality of traders' informa-
tion and on their reaction to order imbalances. Suppose a trader observes a positive
signal and faces a positive order-ow. Upon the receipt of good news he increases
his long position in the asset. On the other hand, his reaction to the order imbal-
ance is either to accommodate it, counting on a future noise trade reversal (and thus
acting as a \market-maker"), or to follow the market and further increase his long
position anticipating an additional price rise (in this way acting as a \short-term"
speculator). The more likely it is that the order imbalance reverts over time due to
liquidity traders' behavior, the more actively the trader will want to accommodate it.
Conversely, the more likely it is that the imbalance is due to informed speculators'
activity, the more the trader will want to follow the market.4 In the former (latter)
case, the trader's speculative position is partially oset (reinforced) by his market
making (short-run speculative) position. Thus, the impact of private information
on the price is partially sterilized (enhanced) by traders' market-making (short-run
speculative) activity. This, in turn, loosens (tightens) the price from (to) the funda-
mentals in relation to average expectations, yielding over- (under-) reliance on public
information.
When long-term traders are in the market, correlation across noise trade incre-
ments helps predicting future noise trade shocks, and tilts traders towards accom-
modating order imbalances. This eect is extreme when the stock of noise traders'
prices may be less biased than investors' average expectations about the fundamentals. This result
depends on the relative weights that in equilibrium traders put on private and public information
and, obviously, could not arise in a fully revealing equilibrium where such a bias cannot arise.
4In this case, indeed, the order imbalance is likely to proxy for upcoming good news that are
not yet completely incorporated in the price. There is a vast empirical literature that documents
the transient impact of liquidity trades on asset prices as opposed to the permanent eect due to
information-driven trades. See e.g. Wang (1994), and Llorente et al. (2002).
4demand is independent across periods.5 The impact of residual uncertainty over the
liquidation value, on the other hand, enhances the hedging properties of future po-
sitions, boosting traders' signal responsiveness and leading them to speculate more
aggressively on short-run price dierences. Thus, depending on the intensity of the
correlation across noise trade increments, over- or under-reliance on public informa-
tion occurs. Conversely, absent correlation across noise trade increments and residual
uncertainty, traders act as in a static market, and the price assigns the optimal sta-
tistical weight to public information. When traders have a short horizon, the lack of
future trading opportunities eliminates intertemporal hedging possibilities. This may
give rise to self-fullling equilibria. In particular, if traders anticipate an order imbal-
ance driven by noise traders (informed traders), they scale down (up) their trading
aggressiveness and accommodate it (follow the market), justifying their prediction
and enforcing an equilibrium with over- (under-) reliance on public information.
This paper contributes to the recent literature that analyzes the eect of higher
order expectations in asset pricing models where traders have dierential information,
but agree on a common prior over the liquidation value. Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2006) study the role of higher order beliefs in asset prices in an innite horizon model
showing that higher order expectations add an additional term to the traditional asset
pricing equation, the higher order \wedge," which captures the discrepancy between
the price of the asset and the average expectations of the fundamentals. According to
our results, higher order beliefs do not necessarily enter the pricing equation. In other
words, for the higher order wedge to play a role in the asset price we need residual
uncertainty to aect the liquidation value or noise trade increments predictability
when traders have long horizons; alternatively, traders must display myopic behavior.
Nimark (2007), in the context of Singleton (1987)'s model, shows that under some
conditions both the variance and the impact that expectations have on the price
decrease as the order of expectations increases.
Other authors have analyzed the role of higher order expectations in models where
traders hold dierent initial beliefs about the liquidation value. Biais and Bossaerts
(1998) show that departures from the common prior assumption rationalize peculiar
trading patterns whereby traders with low private valuations may decide to buy an
asset from traders with higher private valuations in the hope to resell it later on
5Indeed, assuming that the stock of noise trade is i.i.d. implies that the gross position noise traders
hold in a given period n completely reverts in period n + 1. This lowers the risk of accommodating
order imbalances in any period, as speculators can always count on the possibility of unwinding their
inventory of the risky asset to liquidity traders in the coming round of trade.
5during the trading day at an even higher price. Cao and Ou-Yang (2005) study
conditions for the existence of bubbles and panics in a model where traders' opinions
about the liquidation value dier.6 Banerjee et al. (2006) show that in a model with
heterogeneous priors dierences in higher order beliefs may induce price drift.
Our paper is also related to the literature emphasizing the existence of \limits
to arbitrage." De Long et. al (1990) show how the risk posed by the existence of
an unpredictable component in the aggregate demand for an asset can crowd-out
rational investors, thereby limiting their arbitrage capabilities. 7 In our setup, it is
precisely the risk of facing a reversal in noise traders' positions that tilts informed
traders towards accommodating more eagerly order imbalances. In turn, this eect
is responsible for the over-reliance that asset prices place on public information.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature stressing the consequences of traders'
reaction to the aggregate ow of orders. For example, Gennotte and Leland (1990)
argue that investors may exacerbate the price impact of trades, yielding potentially
destabilizing outcomes, by extracting information from the order ow. In our model,
the way in which rational investors interpret aggregate demand realizations is crucial
to determine the weight assigned by the price to public information.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the static bench-
mark, showing that in this framework the asset price places the optimal statistical
weight on public information and is just a noisy version of investors' average expecta-
tions. In section 3 we analyze the dynamic model with long-term traders. In section
4, we then turn our attention to the model with short-term traders. The nal section
discusses the results and provides concluding remarks.
2 The Static Benchmark
Consider a one-period stock market where a single risky asset with liquidation value
v  N( v; 1
v ), and a riskless asset with unitary return are traded by a continuum of
risk-averse speculators in the interval [0;1] together with noise traders. Speculators
have CARA preferences (denote with  the risk-tolerance coecient) and maximize
6Kandel and Pearson (1995) provide empirical evidence supporting the non-common prior as-
sumption.
7Kondor (2004) shows that limits to arbitrage also occur in a 2-period model where informed
traders have market power.
6the expected utility of their wealth: Wi1 = (v   p1)xi1.8 Prior to the opening of
the market every informed trader i receives a signal si1 = v + i1, i1  N(0; 1
1 ),
and submits a demand schedule (generalized limit order) to the market X1(si1;p1)
indicating the desired position in the risky asset for each realization of the equilibrium
price.9 Assume that v and i1 are independent for all i, and that error terms are also
independent across traders. Noise traders submit a random demand u1 (independent
of all other random variables in the model), where u1  N(0; 1
u ). Finally, we make
the convention that, given v, the average signal
R 1
0 si1di equals v almost surely (i.e.
errors cancel out in the aggregate:
R 1
0 i1di = 0).10
In this paper we will use the above CARA-normal framework to investigate con-
ditions under which the equilibrium price is farther away from the fundamentals than
investors' average expectations. Similarly as in Allen et al. (2006) this occurs when-
ever
jE [p1   vjv]j >




   : (1)
The above condition holds if the bias of prices in the estimation of v is larger than the
bias of investors' average expectations or, equivalently, if and only if traders assign
extra weight to public information in relation to the optimal statistical weight in the
estimation of v. Indeed, at a linear symmetric equilibrium for a given private signal








+ (1   P1)E[vjz1];
where P1 = a1=((1 + 1));1  Var[vjp1] 1 = v + a2
1u; and z1 = a1v + u1 is
informationally equivalent to the price. It thus follows that




Owing to normality, on the other hand, one can immediately verify that
E[vjsi1;p1] = E1si1 + (1   E1)E[vjp1];
where E1 = 1=(1 +1) denotes the optimal statistical weight to private informa-
tion. Noting that E[vjp1] = E[vjz1], we have
 E1[v] = E1v + (1   E1)E[vjz1];
8We assume, without loss of generality with CARA preferences, that the non-random endowment
of traders is zero.
9The unique equilibrium in linear strategies of this model is symmetric.
10See Section 3.1 in the Technical Appendix of Vives (2007) for a justication of the convention.
7where  E1[v] =
R 1
0 E[vjsi1;p1]di, using our convention
R 1
0 si1di = v . Since
E
  E1[v]   vjv

= (1   E1)(E[E[vjz1]jv]   v);
and
E[p1   vjv] = (1   P1)(E[E[vjz1]jv]   v);
condition (1) holds if and only if the equilibrium price displays over-reliance on public
information (in relation to the optimal statistical weight):
P1 < E1 , a1 < 1; (2)
where the latter equivalence follows immediately from the denitions of P1 and E1.
In the static model it is well known that a unique equilibrium in linear strate-
gies exists in the class of equilibria with price functional of the form P1 (v;u1) (see
e.g. Admati (1985), Vives (2007)). The equilibrium strategy of a trader i and the
price are given by
X1(si1;p1) = Var[vjsi1;p1]
 1(E[vjsi1;p1]   p1);
p1 = 1z1 + (1   1a1) v;
with z1 = a1v+u1, a1 = 1, 1 = ((1+1)) 1(1+ua1), and 1  Var[vjp1] 1 =
v + a2
1u. The responsiveness of the strategy of a trader to its signal is given by a1,
which determines the precision of the price 1 as an estimator of the fundamental
value v. The depth of the market is measured a usual by 
 1
1 . Since in equilibrium
a1 = 1, we can thus conclude that in a static setup, condition (2) can never be
satised, and the equilibrium price always assigns the optimal statistical weight to
public information.11
Remark 1. There is an alternative, more direct way to verify whether condition (1)
is satised. Indeed, as traders' aggregate demand is proportional to
R 1
0 (E[vjsi1;p1] 
p1)di, imposing market clearing in the above model yields
Z 1
0
xi1di + u1 =
Z 1
0
(1 + 1)(E[vjsi1;p1]   p1)di + u1 = 0;
11If E[u1] is non null, e.g. if E[u1] =  u1 > 0, we have to replace the price p1 by the price net of
the expected noise component ^ p1 = p1    u1Var[vjsi1;z1]=. Using this denition it is immediate to
verify that also when  u1 > 0, in a static market the equilibrium price assigns the optimal statistical
weight to public information.
8and solving for the equilibrium price we obtain




In other words, in equilibrium the price is given by the sum of traders' average
expectations and noise (times a constant). As u1 and v are by assumption orthogonal,
we can therefore conclude that in a static setup the price assigns the optimal statistical
weight to public information. To obtain over-reliance on public information, in other
words, we need to nd conditions under which traders' aggregate demand is no longer
proportional to  E1[v]   p1 and this, in a static context with CARA preferences can
never happen.
In the following sections we will argue that price over-reliance on public informa-
tion can be traced to traders' speculative activity on short-run price movements that
makes strategies depart from the solution of the static setup.
3 A Dynamic Market with Long-Term Traders
Consider now a dynamic extension of the previous model where risk averse traders
and noise traders exchange both the risky and the riskless asset during N  2
periods.12 In period N + 1 the risky asset is liquidated. As before, speculators





n=1 (pn+1   pn)xin + (v   pN)xiN. In any period n an in-
formed trader i receives a signal sin = v + in, where in  N(0; 1
n ), v and in are
independent for all i;n and error terms are also independent both across time periods
and traders.
In the general case noise trading follows an AR(1) process n = n 1 + un with
 2 [0;1] and fungN
n=1 an i.i.d. normally distributed random process (independent of
all other random variables in the model) with un  N(0; 1
u ). If  = 1, fng follows
a random walk and we are in the usual case of independent noise trade increments
un = n   n 1 (e.g. Kyle (1985), Vives (1995)). If  = 0, then noise trading is
i.i.d. across periods (this is the case considered by Allen et al. (2006)), a plausible
assumption only if the time between trading dates is very large. Finally, assume as
before that, given v,
R 1
0 sindi = v (a.s.) in any period n.
12A number of authors have studied competitive, noisy rational expectations equilibria in dynamic
markets, see e.g. Brown and Jennings (1989), Grundy and McNichols (1989), He and Wang (1995),
Vives (1995), Cespa (2002), and Chapters 8 and 9 in Vives (2007).
93.1 A Random Walk Process for Noise Trading
Let us rst consider the classical case when noise trade increments un are independent
across periods ( = 1). In any period 1 < n  N each informed trader has the
vector of private signals sn
i = fsi1;si2;:::;sing available. It follows from normal




t=1 tsit) is sucient for the sequence
sn
i in the estimation of v. An informed trader i in period n submits a limit order
Xin(~ sin;pn 1;), indicating the position desired at every price pn, contingent on his
available information. We will restrict attention to linear equilibria where in every
period n a speculator trades according to Xn(~ sin;pn) = an~ sin   'n(pn), where 'n()
is a linear function of the price sequence pn = fp1;:::;png. 13 Let us denote with
zn the intercept of the n-th period net aggregate demand
R 1
0 xindi + un, where
xin = xin xin 1. The random variable zn  anv+un represents the informational
addition brought about by the n-th period trading round, and can thus be interpreted
as the informational content of the n-th period order-ow.
Lemma 1. In any linear equilibrium the sequences zn and pn are observationally
equivalent.
According to the above lemma in any period n traders form their estimation of
the liquidation value using their private information, summarized by the statistic ~ sin,
and the sequence of public informational additions zn. Thus, owing to normality,




t=1 t~ sin), where E[vjzn] =
 1
n (v v + u
Pn




Proposition 1. In the market with long-term, informed speculators there exists a
unique equilibrium in linear strategies. The equilibrium is symmetric. Prices are
given by po =  v, pN+1 = v, and for n = 1;2;:::;N, pn = nzn+(1 nan)pn 1 and










n]   pn) (4)
= an(~ sin   pn) + n(E[vjz
n]   pn);
where an = (
Pn
t=1 t), an  an   an 1 = n, zn = anv + un, zn = fztgn
t=1,
n = (Var[vjzn]) 1, and n = (1 + uan)=((n +
Pn
t=1 t)).
13The unique equilibrium in linear strategies will be shown to be symmetric.
10Proof. See appendix A. QED
The equilibrium has a static nature: in every period n speculators trade \as if" the
asset would be liquidated in the following period n + 1, exploiting all their available
information. 14 The intuition is as follows: owing to normality and CARA preferences
a trader's strategy is made of two components:
xin = 







; 1  n < N; (5)
where h21 < 0 and h22 > 0 are constants dened in the appendix. The rst component
in (5) accounts for the forecasted price change, while the second component captures
the anticipated future position. Were traders not to expect a change in prices, then
their optimal period n position would be like the one of a static market, and the
risk of holding such a position would only be due to the unpredictability of the
liquidation value (taking into account risk-aversion): (1=)Var[vj~ sin;zn].15 If, on the
other hand a change in prices is expected, traders optimally exploit short-run price
dierences. This, in turn, adds two factors to the risk of their period n position, as
traders also suer from the partial unpredictability of the price change, and from the
impossibility of determining exactly their future position. However, the opportunity
to trade again in the future also grants a hedge against potentially adverse price
movements (h21 < 0). This, in equilibrium, yields a risk-reduction that exactly
osets the risk increase outlined above. As a consequence, even in this case traders'
strategies have a static nature, and xin = E[xin+1j~ sin;zn].
As one would expect, under the conditions of Proposition 1, it is possible to show
that the price assigns the optimal statistical weight to public information in every
period n = 1;2;:::;N. Indeed, owing to normality, we can express informed traders'







= Env + (1   En)E[vjz
n]; (6)
14Proposition 1 generalizes the equilibrium in Cespa (2002) to the case of N  2 periods.
15Intuitively, if given today's information the asset price is not expected to change, no new private
information is expected to arrive to the market and the model collapses to one in which traders hold
for two periods the risky asset. Their position, then, naturally coincides with the one they would





t=1 t), for n = 1;2;:::;N. A similar decomposition









+ (1   Pn)E [vjz
n]; (7)
where Pn = an=((n+
Pn
t=1 t)). Comparing (6) and (7), as done in Section 2 one
can see that in any period n the equilibrium price displays over-reliance on public
information whenever
Pn < En: (8)




t=1 t) = En. Thus,
we can conclude:
Corollary 1. In any period 1  n  N, E[pn   vjv] = E[  En[v]   vjv].
In words: when the market is populated by long-term traders and noise traders'
supply shocks follow a random walk, informed traders' demand has a static nature,
traders assign the optimal statistical weight to public information, and the bias of
prices in the estimation of v is the same as the bias of average expectations. Note that
the static nature of demand implies that traders assign the optimal statistical weight
to public information in the estimation of v. This is so since in this case traders are
only concerned with the nal liquidation value of the asset.
Remark 2. As in section 2, a more direct proof of corollary 1 is available. Indeed,
market clearing at any period n is given by
Z 1
0
xindi + n = 0:
When  = 1 we have that n =
Pn
t=1 ut and according to proposition 1, in this case in
any period n long-term traders' aggregate demand is proportional to
R 1
0 E[vj~ sin;zn]di 











n]   pn)di + n = 0: (9)
Using this condition, we can now express the price as the sum of traders' average
expectations and a risk-weighted noise adjustment:






As n and v are by assumption orthogonal, for all t = 1;2;:::;n, E[pnjv] = E[  En[v]jv],
and the result follows.
12Remark 3. According to (7), and due to traders' risk aversion, in any period the
equilibrium price diers from the conditional expectation of the liquidation value
given public information:






The intuition is as follows: suppose, without loss of generality, that in period n
E[njzn] > 0, then if pn = E[vjzn], traders would be exposed to the risk of holding an
underpriced short position.16 In order to accept holding such a position, (i.e. to oset
such a risk) risk averse traders thus demand a compensation that is proportional to
the expected total noisy noise trade in period n. Such a compensation is larger, the
lower is their risk-tolerance and the larger is their uncertainty over the liquidation
value: Pn=an = 1=((n +
Pn
t=1 t)).17
Remark 4. Vives (1995) studies a market with the same informational structure of
the one analyzed above with  = 1, but where the asset is priced by a competitive
sector of risk-neutral market makers. In this case price setting agents require no
premium to hold a risky position (beyond what is due to the severity of the adverse
selection problem they face), thus Pn = 0 and prices are always \farther away" from
fundamentals than the average expectation among informed traders. The discrepancy
between prices and average expectation is larger, the larger is the ratio between private
and public precision. This is immediate since in this case the unique equilibrium in
linear strategies shares the same informational properties of the one in proposition 1,
while the period n price is given by pn = E[vjzn]. Hence
E[pn   vjv] = 
 1
n v( v   v) and E
  En[v]   vjv

=





and the discrepancy increases in the ratio (n+
Pn
t=1 t)=n  Var[vj~ sin;zn] 1=Var[vjzn] 1.
Redening the benchmark to which prices are compared in terms of the risk-weighted
average expectation among all the traders in the market, we can show that the equiva-
lence result of corollary 1 is restored. Indeed, suppose that together with the informed
traders in the market there also exists a continuum of risk averse (CARA) uninformed
traders. In every period n, the uninformed traders' estimation of the liquidation value
16In other words, they would be exposed to the risk of selling the asset for too low a price with
respect to its actual liquidation value.
17The existence of a premium that aects the equilibrium price in models where risk averse traders
price the asset is well-known in the literature (see e.g. Battacharya and Spiegel (1991)).
13is given by E[vjzn], and the risk-weighted average expectation among all traders in










t=1 t) + Un
;
where U denotes the uninformed traders' risk-tolerance coecient. Letting U ! 1
we then obtain that when dealers are risk neutral  En[v] converges to the equilibrium
price pn = E[vjzn], and in the limit E[pn   vjv] = E[  En[v]   vjv].
3.2 Residual Uncertainty and Correlated noise trade Incre-
ments: Keynes vs. Hayek
In this section we suppose (i) that the fundamentals are aected by the presence of
residual uncertainty, and (ii) that noise trade shocks are serially correlated. Both
the presence of residual uncertainty over the liquidation value and noise traders' pre-
dictability lead traders to speculate on short-run price movements. This drives a
wedge between the equilibrium price and average expectations about the fundamen-
tals which, depending on parameters values, yields either over- or under-reliance on
public information.
Assume thus that the liquidation value traders receive at the terminal date is given
by v +, where   N(0;
 1
 ) is a noise term independent from all the other random
variables in the economy and about which no trader possesses private information,
and that  2 [0;1]. The latter assumption implies that noise trade increments are
negatively correlated, i.e. that a positive (negative) realization of 1 is likely to be
followed by a negative (positive) realization of 2.18 Other things equal, this implies
that traders nd it less risky to accommodate order imbalances in the rst period.
Dening the net informational additions z1 = a1v + u1, and z2 = a2v + u2
(a2 = a2   a1), in a two-period model we can prove the following result:
Proposition 2. In the 2-period market with long-term, informed speculators, resid-
ual uncertainty over the liquidation value, and correlated noise trade increments,
equilibria in linear strategies exist. In any linear equilibrium, (1) prices are given by
p3 = v, p0 =  v, p2 = 2z2 +(1 2a2)^ p1, and p1 = 1z1 +(1 1a1) v; (2) strategies
18To be sure: as 2 = u2 + 1, Cov[2;1] = (   1) 1















(E[vjsi1;z1]   p1) +







where b2 = 2=(1 + ), 2 = ((2 +
P2
t=1 t)) 1(1 + ua2 + ), ^ p1 = (1 +
a1(1 + )) 1(1E[vjz1] + (1 + )z1),   (2 +
P2
t=1 t)=, a2 = a2   a1,




t=1 t)(1 + )(1 + ua2)
















( + h21)(   1)11




h21 (with  + h21 > 0), h22 > 0 are constants dened in the appendix. Furthermore,
in equilibrium  > 1.
Proof. See appendix A. QED
Due to residual uncertainty, a closed form solution for traders' signal responsive-
ness is no longer available: the expressions for a1 and a2 in (12) constitute a system
of non-linear equations whose (potentially multiple) solution(s) must be numerically
determined. According to (11) in the second period traders' strategies keep the static
property. As a consequence, the price assigns the optimal statistical weight to public
information and the bias of the price in the estimation of v coincides with that of
investors' average expectations.19 However, owing to the residual uncertainty aect-
ing the liquidation value, traders scale down their aggressiveness: a2 < (1 + 2).
In the rst period, on the other hand, strategies loose the static property and each
investor's position is no longer proportional to (E[vjsi1;z1]   p1).
Indeed, according to the second of (11), the rst period strategy of a trader can be
decomposed in two parts. The rst part captures the \static" component, while the
second part captures a trader's speculative activity on short-run price movements,
a term whose sign depends on the magnitude of . As argued above, for a given
expected noise trade shock low values of  encourage informed traders to take the
19Using the expressions provided in the appendix this result is immediate.
15other side of the market counting on the noise trade increment future reversion. The
parameter  measures the deviation that residual uncertainty induces in traders' rst
period signal response with respect to the static aggressiveness (note that  depends
on ).20 In any equilibrium of the market it turns out that  > 1, implying that when
residual uncertainty aects the liquidation value, in the rst period traders speculate
more aggressively on their signal. The intuition is as follows: using the expressions
provided in the appendix, we can rewrite a trader's rst period signal responsiveness
















where Varn[Y ] = Var[Y j~ sin;zn], ^ 2 = ((2 +
P2
t=1 t)) 1(1 + ua2) denotes the






The presence of residual uncertainty over the liquidation value produces three eects
on a trader's signal responsiveness. First, as Var2[v] increases to Var2[v +], the rst
period signal becomes a more valuable source of information, and traders put more
weight on it. However, at the same time since the liquidation value is more uncertain,
traders in the second period speculate less aggressively, and p2 becomes more reactive
to the upcoming net informational addition z2 (^ 2 increases to 2). As traders in the
rst period also speculate on short-run price dierences, this drives down a1. Finally,
as traders scale down their second period signal aggressiveness, their second period
strategy becomes less responsive to private information, and thus more correlated
with the second period price. 21 From the point of view of a trader that in the rst
20In the second period, when short-run price dierences cannot be exploited, a trader weights his
private information according to a2 = (1+) 1(
P2
t=1 t). In the rst period a trader that intends
to \buy-and-hold" should trade according to (1+) 11. This intuition can be proved formally by
using the expressions for a trader's rst period strategy provided in the appendix. Indeed, assuming
 = 1, plugging a1 = 1=(1 + ) in (37) and imposing market clearing, we obtain ^ p1 = p1, and
xi1 = E[xi2jsi1;p1] as in the case with no residual uncertainty.
21Suppose a trader expects p2 > p1. Then, he increases his rst period long position, planning
to sell in the second period, and net the short-run prots. However, if p2 < p1, second period sales
are suboptimal, and a good hedge calls for holding on to the long position. This, however, is less
likely to occur if traders are very reactive to their second period information. In this case, indeed,
the second period strategy may unravel the hedge built in the rst period, in turn reducing traders'
willingness to speculate on their rst period information.
16period speculates on price dierences, this makes xi2 a better hedge against adverse
price movements, and has a positive impact on a1. The sum of the positive eects
more than oset the negative one and  > 1.22
As rst period signal responsiveness exceeds its static value, accommodating the
expected noise trade shock may expose traders to the risk of clearing information-
related transactions at an incorrect price. To see this consider the following example.
Suppose that conditional on the observation of z1, the market expects 1 > 0, i.e.
E[1jz1] = 1 + a1(v   E[vjz1]) > 0:
According to the above expression, E[1jz1] > 0 could be due either to a truly positive
liquidity shock (1 > 0) or to a liquidation value higher than its market expectation
(v > E[vjz1]). In the former case, traders should accommodate the shock, counting on
a reversion of the noise trade increment that lowers the risk of holding an unbalanced
position in the asset in the rst period. However, the higher is , the lower are
the chances that noise trade increments compensate over time and the higher is the
possibility that traders sell the asset for too low a price (as  > 1). Hence, as 
increases above 1, traders speculate on a further price increase in the second period,
increasing their long position in the asset.23
Summarizing, the presence of residual uncertainty and correlated noise trade in-
crements leads traders to speculate on short-run price dierences. This, in turn,
makes traders' rst period strategies depart from the static form of the previous sec-
tion, implying that the equilibrium price in the rst period can no longer be expressed
as the sum of traders' average expectations and a risk-weighted noise component. In
22Higher uncertainty over the liquidation value, thus works as a commitment device for a trader's
second period strategy. If in the rst period the trader could be sure that his second period strategy
perfectly hedged adverse price movements, he would more condently speculate on price dierences.
However, traders cannot control the information they receive in the second period, and this makes
xi2 a less reliable hedge for a short-run, speculative strategy. In this perspective higher uncertainty
over the liquidation value ties a trader's hands in the second period: the trader speculates less
aggressively on private information and he can also be more condent that xi2 will better serve his
rst period hedging needs.
23These two types of behavior are reminiscent of the \contrarian" vs. \momentum" type of
strategies. Traders' behavior when  > 1 is also akin to the \resale option" strategy discussed by
Cao and Ou-Yang (2005).
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As a consequence the price may display over- or under-reliance on public information.
Indeed, according to (15) the weight the price assigns to the fundamentals is the sum
of the optimal statistical weight that the average expectation attributes to aggregate
private information (i.e. E1), and a term that is proportional to traders' short-
run speculative trading intensity. When traders deem their estimation of the noise
trade shock to be biased by the presence of information driven trades (i.e. when
 > 1), they \side" with the market (e.g. if E[1jz1] > 0, speculating on a further
price increase). This reinforces the optimal statistical weight E1 with the short-run
speculative trading intensity, moving the price closer to the fundamentals in relation
to average expectations. When, on the other hand, traders count on a reversion of
the second period noise trade increment (i.e. when  < 1), they take the other
side of the market (e.g. if E[1jz1] > 0, they absorb the order imbalance), in this
way partially sterilizing the impact of informed trades on the price. This reduces the
optimal statistical weight E1 and widens the distance between p1 and v in relation
to average expectations.24 When  = 1 the trading strategy in the rst period has
a static nature and there is no speculation on short-run price movements.
We thus have :
Corollary 2. In any linear equilibrium of the market with long-term, informed spec-
ulators when the liquidation value is aected by residual noise the price displays
over-reliance on public information if and only if  < 1.
24To be sure, when  < 1 traders on aggregate hedge their informationally driven speculative
activity with their market making activity. This dampens the eect that the former has on the
equilibrium price.
18Corollary 2 has a straightforward graphical interpretation. To see this suppose
that E[E[1jz1]jv] > 0 (E[E[1jz1]jv] < 0), then if  < 1 we have that v >
E[  E1[v]jv] > E[p1jv] (v < E[  E1[v]jv] < E[p1jv]). Conversely, if  > 1 and E[E[1jz1]jv] >
0 (E[E[1jz1]jv] < 0), we have that v > E[p1jv] > E[  E1[v]jv] (v < E[p1jv] <
E[  E1[v]jv]), the price is more rmly tightened to the fundamentals (see gure 1).
[Figure 1 about here.]
As it happens, when  = 0 ( = 1), over- (under-) reliance on public information
occurs:
Corollary 3. In any linear equilibrium of the market with long-term, informed spec-
ulators when the liquidation value is aected by residual noise, if  = 0 ( = 1) over-
(under-) reliance on public information arises.
Proof When  = 1, the condition for under-reliance on public information is that
 > 1, which holds always given proposition 2. When, on the other hand  = 0,
according to (14) there is always over-reliance on public information. QED
On the other hand if no residual uncertainty aects the liquidation value, over-
reliance on public information always occurs.
Corollary 4. In any linear equilibrium of the market with long-term, informed spec-
ulators when the liquidation value is not aected by residual noise (i.e. 1= = 0)
there always is over-reliance on public information, for any  2 [0;1).
Proof If 1= = 0,  = 1, and according to (14) the condition for over-reliance on
public information is always satised for all  2 [0;1). QED
When  = 0 due to the noise trade increment mean reverting property, traders
in the rst period take an important short-run speculative position and absorb the
expected liquidity shock at a discount. This implies over-reliance on public informa-
tion. As  approaches 1, traders can decreasingly count on a noise trade increment
reversal, and reduce their short-run speculative position. When  = 1, the noise
process follows a random walk and the result of corollary 1 is restored.
Numerical simulations show that for any 1= > 0, there always exists a value of ,
^  below (above) which only over- (under-) reliance on public information occurs. This
allows to dene 
  f(;1=) 2 [0;1]  <+j() = 1g as the set of pairs (;1=)
19for which the price assigns the optimal statistical weight to public information and
rst period strategies have a static nature. Values of (;1=) that fall below (above)
this locus identify market conditions that yield over- or under-reliance on public
information (see gure 2).
[Figure 2 about here.]
The gure divides the parameter space (;1=) into a Keynesian region (below
the locus) with over-reliance on public information and a Hayekian region (the rest)
where the opposite occurs. Less residual uncertainty and less correlation in noise
trading move us towards the Keynesian region. It is interesting to observe also that
the Keynesian region gets larger as risk tolerance  decreases.
Remark 5. Given the discussion following proposition 2 we should expect the weight
the price assigns to public information and the depth of the rst period market to be
related. Indeed if  grows unboundedly it is easy to show that 1j=0 < 1j=1. To
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Thus, P1()j=0 < P1()j=1, and since 1 = a1u=1 + P1v=(a11), the result
follows.
When 1= = 0, traders' responsiveness to private information does not depend
on . As a consequence the rst period depth reaction to a change in  is completely
determined by the eect that a change in the correlation across noise trade increments
has on P1. A wider discrepancy between the price and the fundamentals (a smaller
P1) proxies for a stronger sterilization of informed trades due to traders' intense
market making activity. This dampens the price impact of trades, making the rst
period market deeper.
When  < 1 numerical simulations conrm that the rst period depth is larger
(smaller) when  = 0 ( = 1). Furthermore, as  increases, both P1 and 1 grow
larger, implying that a stronger excessive weight on public information occurs in a
deeper market.
Remark 6. According to Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) in the presence of
dierential information, higher order expectations add an additional term (the \higher
order wedge") to the traditional asset pricing equation. This term emerges as the
20dierence between the equilibrium price and the asset price that obtains substituting
higher order expectations with rst order expectations in the pricing equation. We can
apply this decomposition to (14) using the fact that  E1[  E2[v]] =  E1[v]+((1+1)(2+
P2
t=1 t)) 111(E[vjz1]   v) =  E1[v]   (a1(2 +
P2
t=1 t)) 11E1(E[1jz1] + 1).
Denoting with p
1 the asset price obtained substituting higher order expectations with
rst order expectations, the higher order wedge is given by
p1   p







and captures the expectational error about the liquidation value due to the presence
of noise in the public signal (z1). Using this denition, the equilibrium price can be
written as
p1 =  E1[v]  













According to section 3.1 when  = 1, as soon as residual uncertainty vanishes,  ! 1
and the higher order wedge ceases to aect the pricing equation.
4 The Market with Short-Term Traders
In the previous section we have argued that a stronger focus on short-run price dier-
ences allows over- or under-reliance on public information and relative departures of
prices from average expectations of investors to arise in the CARA-normal model with
long-term traders. In this section we turn our attention to the analysis of a dynamic
model in which traders are exclusively concentrated on short-run prot opportunities
and  2 [0;1]. In this case short-run speculation is imposed and we should expect
the bias of prices and average expectations not to coincide. In the absence of resid-
ual uncertainty over the liquidation value, and as long as  > 0; multiple equilibria
arise. In one equilibrium there is over-reliance on public information and in the other
one under-reliance occurs. The former equilibrium is the stable one. When  = 0
or when  = 1 and considerable residual uncertainty aects the liquidation value,
over-reliance on public information always arises in the rst period price.
Suppose thus that in the dynamic market analyzed in the previous section traders
have short-term horizons (i.e. they take a position in period n and unwind it in
period n + 1) and that the private information each trader i receives in every period
21n is transmitted to the corresponding trader in period n + 1.25 Traders may have
a short horizon for incentive reasons, for example. Thus, in every period n every
trader i maximizes the expected utility of his short-term prots in = (pn+1 pn)xin,
E[U(in)j~ sin;pn] =  E[expf in=gj~ sin;pn].
4.1 A General Pricing Formula
Before turning attention to the linear equilibria of the market, it is worth analyzing
the general pricing formula. Assume that N = 2. Owing to CARA preferences and
normality, in the second period a trader's optimal position is given by X2(~ si2;p2) =
(Var[vj~ si2;z2]) 1(E[vj~ si2;z2] p2); while the corresponding market clearing equation
reads as follows:
R 1
0 xi2di + 2 = 0. Let Varn[Y ] = Var[Y j~ sin;zn], and  En[Y ] =
R 1
0 E[Y j~ sin;zn]di, then the second period equilibrium price is given by




Owing to short-term trading horizons, in the rst period a trader's optimal position
is given by X1(si1;p1) = (Var[p2jsi1;p1]) 1(E[p2jsi1;p1] p1), and the corresponding
market clearing equation reads as follows:
R 1
0 xi1di + 1 = 0. Solving for the rst
period equilibrium price yields




Substituting (16) in the latter equation and using the fact that 2 = 1 + u2 with
u2 serially uncorrelated, yields











According to (16) and (17), in any period the price of the asset depends on two com-
ponents: the market average expectation of the market average expected liquidation
value and the risk associated with holding a position in the asset (due to the presence
of noise traders).26
25This is without loss of generality. The same qualitative results would arise if traders in period
n did not inherit the information held by their previous period peers.
26This is generally true in both periods since in the rst period traders anticipate liquidating their
position at p2, whereas in the second period traders hold the asset until uncertainty is resolved.





























for 1  n  N.27 Recall that when  = 1 we have that n =
Pn
t=1 ut. The
above pricing formula coincides with Allen et al. (2006) when  = 0. Indeed, in
their framework additional noise shocks do not cumulate over the trading periods.
Hence, the price in period N is simply the average expectation of investors about the
fundamental value plus the period N risk-adjusted noise shock:




In period N  1 the price is then given by the average expectation of investors about
the price in period N (because investors have a one period horizon) plus the corre-
sponding period, risk-adjusted noise shock:




When  = 0,  EN 1[N] = 0. Hence, we obtain
pN 1 =  EN 1






This recursive relationship can be iterated backwards to obtain that in any period n












Thus, pn is the average expectation at n of the average expectation at n + 1 of
the average expectation at n + 2 of...the liquidation value in period N + 1; plus the
corresponding period, risk-adjusted noise shock. This is reminiscent of Keynes' vision
of the stock market as a beauty contest.
An interesting observation by Allen et al. (2006) is that, when averaging over
the realizations of noise trading, the price at date n { the average expectation of
the average expectation of the...{ will in general not coincide with the period n
27See appendix B.
23average expectation of the fundamental value (the price at N + 1). In this sense the
consensus value of the fundamentals  En[v] does not coincide with the price pn, with
the exception of the last period n = N. The mean price path pn gives a higher weight
to history { relies more on public information { than the mean consensus path  En[v].
This is because of the bias towards public information when a Bayesian agent has
to forecast the average market opinion knowing that it is formed also on the public
information observed by other agents. This also implies that the current price will be
always farther away from fundamentals than the average of investors' expectations
and that it will be more sluggish to adjust.
However, according to the previous section we know that the weight the price as-
signs to public information depends on traders' reaction to order imbalances. Indeed,
whenever traders deem the order-ow to be mostly liquidity driven, they take the
other side of the market, in this way partially sterilizing the eect of informed trades
on the price. This reinforces the eect of public information on the price, driving the
latter away from the fundamentals compared to the average opinion of traders in the
market. If, on the other hand, traders estimate the order-ow to be mostly informa-
tion driven, they speculate on price momentum reinforcing the impact of informed
trades on the price. This weakens the weight on public information, tying the price
more rmly to the fundamentals compared to investors' average expectations. Intu-
itively, the same eects should be at work in a market where traders have short-term
horizons. Indeed, in the coming section we formalize this intuition showing that the
results in Allen et al. (2006) can be overturned when noise trading is not independent
across periods, i.e. examining the case  2 (0;1] with no residual uncertainty. We
also present an example with large residual uncertainty and  = 1 where over-reliance
on public information always occurs.
4.2 Short-Term Trading and the Bias of Prices
Suppose N = 2, and let  2 (0;1], then we can prove the following result:28
Proposition 3. In the 2-period market with short-term traders when  2 (0;1]
there exist two symmetric equilibria in linear strategies where: (1) prices are given by
p3 = v, po =  v, p2 = 2z2 +(1 2a2)^ p1, and p1 = 1z1 +(1 1a1) v, (2) strategies
28Proposition 3 extends the multiplicity result in Cespa (2002) to the case of general patterns of
noise trading and private information arrival.










where a2 = (1 +2), a1 is given by the (two) real solutions to the quartic equation
f(a1)  2a1(2+1) a2u1 = 0, which satisfy 0 < a


















In any equilibrium ^ p1 = (a1+1) 1(z1+1E[vjz1]), 2 = ((2+
P2
t=1 t)) 1(1+
a2u), and  = (a1=1). Therefore, a
1 < a2= < a
1 and 2(a
1 ) < 0 < 2(a
1).
Proof. See appendix A. QED
Owing to short horizons traders speculate on short-run price movements. However,
dierently from section 3.2, they cannot count on a second period hedge to protect
them from adverse price swings. This induces two (self-fullling) equilibria. Along
the high trading intensity equilibrium (i.e. when a1 = a
1 > a2=) agents escalate
their response to the private signal and thus anticipate their estimation of the noise
trade shock to be biased by the presence of informed trades. As a consequence, they
side with the market ( > 1), and speculate on price momentum. The magnitude of
the rst period signal aggressiveness (a
1 > a2=), in turn induces a negative second
period depth (2(a
1 ) < 0) which limits adverse price movements when traders unwind
their position in the second period, justifying their rst period speculative behavior.
Along the low trading intensity equilibrium (i.e. when a1 = a
1 < 1) traders scale
down their rst period response to the signal, and thus anticipate their estimation
of the noise trade shock to be due to liquidity trades. As a consequence, they take
the other side of the market ( < 1), and speculate on a noise trade increment
reversion. The magnitude of the rst period aggressiveness (a
1 < a2=) induces a
positive second period depth (2(a
1) > 0), which again justies informed traders'
rst period behavior. Thus, in the absence of a risk neutral market making sector (as
in Vives (1995)) short-term trading delivers equilibrium multiplicity.





25a measure of the deviation that short-term horizons induce in traders' rst period
signal response with respect to the static response. Depending on the equilibrium
that arises  > (<)1, and, as in the previous section it is possible to relate the
presence of an over-reliance on public information in the rst period to the magnitude
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Using the last equation in (20) we readily realize as before that the existence of a
discrepancy between prices and investors' average expectations depends on the sign
of (   1). In the low trading intensity equilibrium we have a
1 < 1= ,  < 1=,
traders thus accommodate the expected noise trade shock and over-reliance on public
information occurs. In the high trading intensity equilibrium we have a
1 > 1= ,
 > 1=, traders side with the market and under-reliance on public information arises.
Hence, we can conclude that:
Corollary 5. In the market with short-term traders along the low (high) trading
intensity equilibrium the rst period equilibrium price displays over- (under-) reliance
on public information.
It is again an immediate consequence of (20) that
Corollary 6. In the market with short-term traders when  = 0 there exists a
unique equilibrium in linear strategies. In this equilibrium over-reliance on public
information occurs.
As  approaches 0, along the high trading intensity equilibrium traders need to
speculate increasingly more aggressively to avoid an adverse price swing in the second
period, up to the point that if  = 0, a
1 should grow unboundedly. However, in this
29In the second period traders act as in a static market and, as argued in the previous section, in
this case the price assigns the optimal statistical weight to public information.
26case the equilibrium becomes fully revealing, p2 = p1 = v, and traders earn no return
from their private information. Hence, they concentrate on the low trading intensity
equilibrium. Our model then coincides with Allen et al. (2006) and the rst period
equilibrium price is always more biased than average expectations in the estimation
of the fundamentals (see gure 3).
[Figure 3 about here.]
Remark 7. Dierently from what happens in the market with long-term traders,
when traders have short horizons over- (under-) reliance on public information occurs
in a thin (thick) rst period market. The intuition is as follows. As argued above
over-reliance on public information arises along the low trading intensity equilib-
rium where, given traders' low aggressiveness, the degree of adverse selection is high.
Thus, in this equilibrium the market is thin. Conversely, under-reliance on public in-
formation occurs in the high trading intensity equilibrium where traders' speculative
aggressiveness yields a faster resolution of the underlying uncertainty, reducing the
degree of adverse selection. This, in turn, yields a thick market (see gure 4).
[Figure 4 about here.]
Remark 8. In the market with short-term traders it is again possible to apply Bac-
chetta and Van Wincoop (2006) decomposition to the equilibrium price. As one would
expect, along the high (low) trading intensity equilibrium a positive wedge (integrat-
ing out the eect of the noise term) ties the price more rmly to the fundamentals in
relation to average expectations. Conversely, along the low trading intensity equilib-
rium the opposite occurs.
Remark 9. Summarizing, as soon as additional noise traders' demand shocks become
correlated, both over- and under-reliance on public information arises. In a model
with  = 1, Cespa (2002) proves that along the high trading intensity equilibrium
since a
1 > a2, the slope of the aggregate excess demand function is always positive,
arguing that as a consequence, the equilibrium in this case is unstable. Using our
results we can build a similar argument for a market in which  2 (0;1). In particular,
given the realization of the rst period informational shock z1, we can dene the
second period aggregate excess demand function as follows:
XD(p2)  z2 + 
 1
2 (1   2a2)^ p1   
 1
2 p2; (21)
27where XD = 0 when the market is in equilibrium and XD 6= 0 otherwise. Notice
that the slope of (21) depends on the sign of 2. This can be determined using the
equation that denes the rst period signal responsiveness:
f(a1)  2a1(2 + 1)   a2u1 = 0:
In the high trading intensity equilibrium, we know that a2 < 0, hence for f(a1) = 0
to be satised it must be that 2 < 0 too. Conversely, along the low trading intensity
equilibrium we have a2 > 0, hence for a solution to f(a1) = 0 to exist, 2 must
also be positive.30 In the unstable case notice that a price decline (e.g. spurred
by a selling pressure) drives the market away from equilibrium. In the low trading
intensity equilibrium, the aggregate excess demand function slopes downwards, and
the associated equilibrium is stable. Hence, restricting attention to stable equilibria
we can conclude that the equilibrium featuring over-reliance on public information
in Allen et al. (2006) is robust.
Remark 10. A further feature of the equilibrium obtained in proposition 3 is that
prices do not necessarily display inertia. In particular, along the high (low) trading
intensity equilibrium, the rst period price rapidly (slowly) adjusts to the fundamen-
tals. Indeed, as traders \overreact" to their signal, after the rst period the price
jumps close to v and then fully adjusts in the following two periods. Thus, dierently
from Allen et al. (2006) the equilibrium price exhibits inertia if and only if  < 1.
4.3 The Eect of Residual Uncertainty
If the liquidation value is aected by residual uncertainty and  = 1 we can prove
that over-reliance on public information occurs in the rst period whenever such
uncertainty is suciently large. To see this, consider that in the second period the
equilibrium strategy of a trader coincides with the one of the model with long-term





where E[p2jsi1;z1] = 2a2E[vjsi1;z1] + (1   2a2)^ p1, Var[p2jsi1;z1] = 
2
2(2 +
1)=(u(1+1)), and 2, ^ p1 are dened in proposition 2. Thus, identifying the rst
30Incidentally, the above equation also shows that a1 > 0 in equilibrium since if a1 < 0 both













+ (1   P1)E[vjz1]









=  E1[v] +
(   1)11








P1  E1 +
(   1)11




and  = a1( +2 +
P2
t=1 t)=(1), denotes a measure of the deviation that the
joint eect of residual uncertainty and short-term horizons induce on traders' rst
period signal aggressiveness with respect to the static aggressiveness. We can thus
conclude the following:
Corollary 7. In any linear equilibrium of the market with short-term, informed
speculators when the liquidation value is aected by residual noise, over-reliance on
public information occurs if and only if  < 1.
Intuitively, the above condition is more likely to be satised whenever the residual
uncertainty aecting the liquidation value is suciently large. Indeed, as in the mar-
ket with long-term traders, higher uncertainty over the liquidation value exacerbates
the reaction of the second period price to the upcoming net informational addition
z2. However, owing to short-term horizons, traders cannot count on the improved
hedging properties of their second period strategies. Hence, in the face of the in-
creased second period price unpredictability, traders in the rst period should scale
down their aggressiveness yielding a price which is less anchored to the fundamentals
compared to traders' average expectations.31 This intuition can be formalized by the
following
31The increased uncertainty over the second period price in a way \crowds-out" informed traders
in the rst period. This eect is reminiscent of De Long et al. (1990). Note, however, that in our
context all traders { except liquidity traders { are \rational."
29Proposition 4. In any linear equilibrium of the market with short-term traders, when
the liquidation value is aected by the presence of residual uncertainty, for suciently
large residual uncertainty over-reliance on public information always arises in the rst
period.
Proof. See appendix A. QED
Numerical simulations show that for low values of  the equilibrium where the
price displays over-reliance on public information is unique.32
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied under what conditions asset prices display over- or
under-reliance on public information and are more or less biased than traders' average
expectations in the estimation of fundamentals in a variety of market contexts. We
argued that for over- or under-reliance on public information to occur traders need
to speculate on short-run price dierences. If, instead, agents only care about the
liquidation value of the asset, their strategies have a static nature. Hence, traders
assign the optimal statistical weight to public information and prices equal the average
expectations of investors plus a risk-weighted noise component. This is the case
when long-term traders populate the market, there is no residual uncertainty in the
liquidation value, and noise trading follows a random walk. When traders speculate
on short run price dierences, because of noise trade increments persistence and/or
uncertainty in the liquidation value of the asset, then they may over- or under-weight
public information and prices may be more or less biased than average expectations.
According to the degree of correlation of noise trading and the relevance of residual
uncertainty we nd in fact a Keynesian region where the former occurs and a Hayekian
region where the latter occurs. When traders have a short horizon multiple equilibria
arise, with one equilibrium displaying over-reliance and the other one under-reliance
on public information. In this case the equilibrium displaying over-reliance is the
stable one.
Our paper thus shows that in contrast to the results put forth by Allen et al.
(2006), there are situations where equilibrium prices may have less bias in estimating
fundamentals than the consensus opinion of traders. Indeed, the avor of Keynes'
beauty contest allegory obtains when traders focus their short-term activities on the
32Conversely, as  increases, the multiplicity result of the previous section is restored.
30exploitation of noise trade predictability. This happens in the stable equilibrium of
the market with short-term traders and, with long-term traders, when noise trade
increments are very correlated and residual uncertainty on the liquidation value is
low. Otherwise, an alternative result, more in line with Hayek (1945)'s view of the
market arises when informed trades drive the order-ow and speculators short-term
trading activity reinforces the weight the price assigns to fundamental information.
This may happen with short-term traders in an unstable equilibrium, and with long-
term traders when noise trade increments are not very correlated and the residual
uncertainty aecting the liquidation value is high.
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33Appendix A
Proof of lemma 1
Consider the rst period. In any linear equilibrium market clearing yields
R 1
0 a1si1 
'1(p1)di + 1 = a1v   '1(p1) + 1 = 0 or, denoting with z1 = a1v + 1 the informa-
tional content of the rst period order-ow, z1 = '1(p1), where '1() is a linear
function. Hence, z1 and p1 are observationally equivalent. Suppose now that zn 1 =
fz1;z2;:::;zn 1g and pn 1 = fp1;p2;:::;pn 1g are observationally equivalent and
consider the n-th period market clearing condition:
R 1
0 Xn(~ sin;pn 1;pn)di + n = 0.
Adding and subtracting
Pn 1





where 'n() is a linear function, and zt = atv+ut denotes the informational content
of the t-th period order-ow. As by assumption pn 1 and zn 1 are observationally
equivalent, it follows that observing pn is equivalent to observing zn. QED
Proof of proposition 1
Given the past trading history, in the last trading period (N) each informed trader
maximizes the expected utility of his last period prot iN = (v  pN)xiN. Owing to














where aN = (
PN
t=1 t). Imposing market clearing yields
Z 1
0








di + N = 0:
Adding and subtracting
PN 1
n=1 anv to the above, and rearranging:
(1 + uaN)zN +
N 1 X
n=1
(1 + uan)zn + v v = (aN + N)pN:
Denoting with N = (1+uaN)=(aN +N) the N-th period reciprocal of market
depth we can solve for pN obtaining
pN = NzN + (1   NaN)^ pN 1; (24)
34where ^ pN k = N klzN k+(1 N klaN 1)^ pN (k+1)l, and ^ N k = (1+uaN k)=(aN k+
















In period N   1 the trader then maximizes
E



























t=1 N)). As one can easily check iN 1 is a quadratic
form of the random vector Z = (xiN   1;pN   2)0, which is normally distributed








(aN   N)2u + (N 1 +
PN 1
t=1 t)(1 + 2uN) 









(i.e. 1 = E[xiNj~ siN 1;zN 1] = (N +
PN
t=1 N)(1   NaN)(E[vj~ siN 1;zN 1]  
^ pN 1) and 2 = E[pNj~ siN 1;zN 1] = NaNE[vj~ siN 1;zN 1] + (1   NaN)^ pN 1):
iN 1 = c + b
0Z + Z
0AZ;
where c = (2 pN 1)xiN 1+2
1=(2(N+
PN
t=1 N)), b = (1=((N+
PN
t=1 N));xiN 1)0,
and A is a 2  2 matrix with a11 = 1=(2(N +
PN
t=1 N)) and the rest zeroes. Ow-
ing to a well-known property of multivariate normal random variables the objective
function (25) can then be rewritten as
E
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2VarN 1[pN] + VarN[v](VarN 1[xiN]VarN 1[pN]   CovN 1[xiN;pN]2)
D
;
and Varn[Y ] = Var[Y j~ sin;zn], CovN 1[X;Y ] = Cov[X;Y j~ sN 1;zN 1], D = 2 +















since (NaN   h21(1   NaN))=h22 = (N 1 +
PN 1
t=1 N). Substituting aN 1



































(pN 1   ^ pN 1): (28)
Interpreting ^ pN 1 as the \static" period N   1 equilibrium price (i.e. the price that
would arise if the asset was liquidated in period N), a trader i's strategy is thus
the sum of his static position and the adjustment he makes to exploit short-run
price movements. For example, suppose that E[vj~ siN 1;zN 1]   ^ pN 1 > 0, but that
pN 1 > ^ pN 1, then the trader scales down his period N   1 static position to avoid


























































Hence, since =h22 6= 0, (29) is satised if and only if ^ pN 1 = ^ N 1zN 1 + (1  
^ N 1aN 1)^ pN 2 = pN 1: traders' aggregate static position is just enough to hold the





















Plugging (30) into the term in parenthesis in the exponential of (26) we can now















given that, as one can check, in equilibrium








iN 1. The N   2-th objective function of a trader is then given by
E























Comparing (31) with (25) the form of the objective function in the recursion between
the N   1-th and the N   2-th period looks exactly as the one in the recursion
between the N-th and the N   1-th period. Thus, the trader's optimal strategy in
37period N 2 is given by xiN 2 = aN 2(~ siN 2 pN 2)+N 2(E[vj~ siN 2;zN 2] pN 2),
where aN 2 = (
PN 2
t=1 t), and the corresponding equilibrium price is given by:
pN 2 = N 2zN 2 + (1   N 2aN 2)^ pN 3;
where N 2 = (1 + uaN 2)=(aN 2 + N 2). Iterating this procedure until the
rst period, we obtain that xin = an(~ sin   pn) + n(E[vjzn]   pn), an = 
Pn
t=1 t,
and ^ pn = pn for all 1  n  N.
Note that since at equilibrium n = (an + n) 1(1 + uan), and ^ pn = pn,
evaluating 1 at equilibrium we obtain





















Hence, xiN 1 = E[xiNjsiN 1;zN 1]. Now, dene 0
1 = E[xiN 1j~ siN 2;zN 2] = (N 1+
PN 1
t=1 t)(1   N 1aN 1)(E[vj~ siN 2;zN 2]   pN 2), and since N 1 = (aN 1 +
N 1) 1(1 + uaN 1), evaluating 0













Thus xiN 2 = E[xiN 1j~ siN 2;zN 2]. Iterating this procedure it follows that xin =
E[xin+1j~ sin;zn].
Finally, in any period n the response to private information is equal across traders.
Hence, the equilibrium is symmetric. QED
Proof of proposition 2
To nd the equilibria of the model we proceed as illustrated in the proof of propo-







E[vj~ si2;z2]   p2
Var[v + j~ si2;z2]
= a2(~ si2   p2) + b2(E[vjz






b2 = 2=(1+), and  = (2+
P2
t=1 t)=. Imposing market clearing, we nd that
the second period equilibrium price is given by
p2 = 2z2 + (1   2a2)^ p1;
where 2 = (2 +
P2
t=1 t)) 1(1 + ua2 + ), a2 = a2   a1, and
^ p1 =
1E[vjz1] + (1 + )z1
1 + a1(1 + )
:
Notice that P2 = ((2 +
P2
t=1 t)) 1a2(1 + ) = E2. Hence, in the second
period the price assigns the optimal statistical weight to public information. Sub-
stituting (32) in the second period objective function, a trader in the rst period
maximizes









(p2   p1)xi1 +
x2






Let i1 = (p2 p1)xi1+x2
i2Var[v+j~ si2;z2]=(2). The term i1 is a quadratic form of
the random vector Z = (xi2 1;p2 2)0, which is normally distributed (conditionally









(a2(1 + )   2)2u + (1 + 1)((1 + )2 + 2u2)
(1 + 1)u(1 + )2 ;
Cov[xi2;p2jsi1;z1] = 2

(2   (1 + )a2)a2u   (1 + )(1 + 1)











(i.e. 1 = E[xi2jsi1;z1] = (a2+b2)(1 2a2)(E[vjsi1;z1] ^ p1) and 2 = E[p2jsi1;z1] =
2a2E[vjsi1;z1] + (1   2a2)^ p1):
i1 = c + b
0Z + Z
0AZ;
39where c = (2   p1)xi1 + 2
1Var[v + j~ si2;z2]=(2), b = (1Var[v + j~ si2;z2]=;Xi1)0,
and A is a 22 matrix with a11 = Var[v+j~ si2;z2]=(2) and the rest zeroes. We can
now rewrite the objective function (34) as























h211Var[v + j~ si2;z2]
h22
; (37)


























(E[vjsi1;z1]   ^ p1)  

h22




(E[vjsi1;z1]   p1) +
( + h21)(1   2a2)
h22
(^ p1   p1);
where a1 denotes the 1st period trading aggressiveness:
a1 =





t=1 t)(1 + )(1 + ua2)
(1 +  + ua2)(2 + (2 + 1)(1 + ))
: (39)
Both (33) and (39) are implicit solutions for a1 and a2. Thus, equilibria must be de-
termined via numerical methods.33 Rearranging the rst period equilibrium strategy
33If  ! 1, residual noise vanishes,  ! 0 and an ! (
Pn
t=1 t) as in proposition 1.
40yields the second of (11). Using this expression and imposing market clearing yields








and the expression for P1 is given by (15). In order to obtain the expression for
the rst period equilibrium price given in (14), we impose market clearing on (38)
obtaining  1
1 a1(1 + 1)
R 1
0 (E1[v]   ^ p1)di   (=h22)(p1   ^ p1) + 1 = 0. Simplifying
the latter condition yields
1(   1)




(p1   ^ p1) = 0; (40)
which can be easily rearranged to obtain (14). Notice also that according to the above
market clearing equation the rst period equilibrium price will dier from the static
solution as long as  6= 1=.
To show existence note that (12) denes a system of non-linear equations. Let us
denote with f(a1;a2) = 0 the equation dening a2, and with g(a1;a2) = 0 the equation
dening a1. Both f() and g() are continuous. In particular, it is easy to check that




2a1u + a2(1 + a2
1u))   (
P2
t=1 t) = 0 is
a nondegenerate cubic in a2, given that ( +
P2
t=1 t)u > 0, and always admits




4a2a1u + 1 + a2
1u) and the discriminant associated to this quadratic equation in
a1 can be shown to be negative, we have that @f=@a2 6= 0 and the solutions to the
cubic equation are continuous in a1.34 Hence, denoting by a2(a1) a (real) solution to
the cubic we have that
lim
a1!0a2(a1) =  a2 > 0; lim
a1!1a2(a1) = 0:
We can now verify that a real solution always exists to the equation g(a1;a2(a1)) = 0.
Indeed,
lim
a1!0g(a1;a2(a1)) = 1 (1 +  a2u)
 










and the result follows.
34Indeed, as one can check   16a2
12
u   12u(1 + a2
1u) =  (8a2
1u + 12v)u < 0.
41We are now left with the task of proving that in any linear equilibrium  > 1.
Notice that in any equilibrium a1 > 0, hence if 1 + ua2 > (<)0, then also
1 +  + ua2 > (<)0.35 Notice also that if a2 < 0 then 1 +  + ua2 < 0. To













where D = (1 +  + ua2)(2 + (2 + 1)(1 + ))(1 + ). Suppose that a2 < 0
but that (1 +  + ua2) > 0, then given (41) this is impossible.
To prove our claim start by assuming that a2 > 0, then using (39) we can












which is clearly impossible. If, on the other hand a2 < 0, given what we have said
above for  < 1 we need








which is again impossible.36 Therefore, in any linear equilibrium  > 1.
QED
Proof of proposition 3
In the second period a trader speculates according to X2(~ si2;p2) = (=Var[vj~ si2;z2])
(E[vj~ si2;z2]   p2). Imposing market clearing yields
Z 1
0
xi2di + 2 =














35For suppose a1 < 0, then a2 > 0 and both 1+ua2 > 0 and 1+ua2 + > 0, implying
a1 > 0, a contradiction.
36Suppose 2 = 0, then a1 must satisfy (a1(1+) 1)+ua2(a1  1) = 0. It is easy to
see that a solution to this equation is a1 = a2 = 1=(1+). Then, P1 = E1 and the rst period
price assigns the optimal statistical weight to public information. The intuition is straightforward: if
2 = 0 the second period price is just a noisy version of p1, traders do not expect any price variation
that justies a rebalancing of their speculative position in the second period, and the absence of
over-reliance on public information when n = 2 also extends to the rst period.
42where a2 = (1 + 2), and 2 = u2 + 1. Let a2 = a2   a1, then the above
market clearing condition can be rewritten as
z2 + z1 + 2E[vjz
2] = (a2 + 2)p2;
where z2 = a2v + u2. Rearranging it yields
p2 = 2z2 + (1   2a2)^ p1;
where 2 = (a2 + 2) 1(1 + 2a2), and
^ p1 =
v v + ( + ua1)z1
a1 + 1
:
In the rst period owing to short-term horizons X1(si1;p1) = (=Var[p2jsi1;z1])(E[p2jsi1;z1] 
p1), where E[p2jsi1;z1] = 2a2E[vjsi1;z1] + (1   2a2)^ p1, and Var[p2jsi1;z1] =

2





Let f(a1)  a12(2 + 1)   a2u1. The solutions to the quartic f(a1) = 0
clearly identify the equilibria of the model. Notice that f(0) =  a21u < 0, while
f(1) =
1((2(1   ) + 
2)22
1u + 1(1 + (1   )22u) + v)
2 + (2(1   ) + 
2)22
1u + 22
2u + 1(1 + 2(1   )22u) + v
> 0:
Hence, a rst solution a










and lima1!1 f(a1) =  1; a further solution a
1 to f(a1) = 0 belongs to the interval
(a2=;1). To see that these are the only two real solutions (i.e. that the remaining
two roots must be complex), notice that the cubic equation f0(a1) = 0 has a unique
real root (its discriminant is positive). Hence, the graph of f(a1) changes slope only
once (between a
1 and a
1 ). Rearranging the rst period market clearing equation
yields (20), where P1  E1(1 + (   1)1=(2 +
P2
t=1 t)), and  = a1=(1).
According to the latter of (20), over-reliance on public information occurs whenever
P1 < E1 , a1 < (1=). which in the rst equilibrium is always satised since
we have a
1 < 1 < 1=. Next, insucient reliance on public information arises
if and only if P1 > E1 , a1 > (1=), which in the second equilibrium is
43again always satised since a
1 > a2= > 1=. Using the denition of P1 and








Finally, note that for f(a1)  a12(2 + 1)   a2u1 = 0 to have a real
solution it must be the case that 2 and a2 have the same sign. In the high trading
intensity equilibrium a
1 > a2=, and a2 < 0. Therefore, 2(a
1 ) < 0.
QED
Proof of corollary 6
Imposing  = 0 in (43) one can see that the linear equilibria of the model are given
by the solutions to the following cubic equation f(a1)  a12(2+1) a2u1 = 0.













showing that the equilibrium is unique. QED
Proof of proposition 4
To prove the claim we check what happens to  = a1( +2+
P2
t=1 t)=(1)



















and lim!0 a2 = lim!0 (1 + 2)=( + (2 +
P2












since, as argued above, in the limit a1 = a2 = 0. By continuity of  as a function
of (a1;a2), there must then exist an interval (0;
), such that for all  2 (0;
) we
have  < 1. QED
44Appendix B
In this appendix we generalize the pricing formula obtained in section 4.1 to the
N  2-period case. To x notation, let  En[Y ] =
R 1
0 E[Y j~ sin;pn]di, and Varn[Y ] =
Var[Y j~ sin;pn]. In the N-th period the market clearing equation reads as follows:

 EN[v]   pN
VarN[v]
+ N = 0:
Therefore, the price of the asset in period N is given by




In period N   1, optimality and market clearing require that

 EN 1[pN]   pN 1
VarN 1[pN]
+ N 1 = 0;
and using (44) the corresponding market clearing price is given by:
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Figure 1: If    < 1 (   > 1) E[p1|v] lays in the thickly (thinly) meshed area, and
over- (under-) reliance on public information occurs. Note that since E[ ¯ E1[v]|v] =
 E1v + (1    E1)E[E[v|z1]|v], E[ ¯ E1[v]|v]   v   ¯ v   v.
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Figure 1: If  < 1= ( > 1=) E[p1jv] lays in the thickly (thinly) meshed area, and
over- (under-) reliance on public information occurs. Note that since E[  E1[v]jv] =







0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1/  
 
  = 1/10   = 2   = 4
Figure 2: The ﬁgure plots the set     {( ,1/  )   [0,1]    +|  ( ) = 1} for
    {1/10,2,4} (parameters’ values:  v =  u =   n = 1). Values of ( ,1/  ) that
fall below (above) this set identify market conditions leading to over (under) reliance
on public information. As   increases, traders speculate more and more aggressively
on their ﬁrst period information. This increases the relevance of informed trades in
the aggregate order-ﬂow, widening the parameter space for which under reliance on
public information occurs.
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Figure 2: The gure plots the set 
  f(;1=) 2 [0;1]  <+j() = 1g for
 2 f1=10;2;4g (parameters' values: v = u = n = 1). Values of (;1=) that
fall below (above) this set identify market conditions leading to over (under) reliance
on public information. As  increases, traders speculate more and more aggressively
on their rst period information. This increases the relevance of informed trades in
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a1
  = .6
  = .4
  = 0
Figure 3: The continuous (heavily, lightly dotted) curve graphs the equation that
determines the equilibria when   = .6 (  = .4,   = 0). Since a 
1 <    1/  < a  
1 , as
    0,    1/     , the high trading intensity equilibrium disappears and only the
low trading intensity equilibrium survives (parameter values:  v =  u =   n =   = 1
and     {0,.4,.6}).
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Figure 3: The continuous (heavily, lightly dotted) curve graphs the equation that
determines the equilibria when  = :6 ( = :4,  = 0). Since a
1 < 1= < a
1 , as
 ! 0, 1= ! 1, the high trading intensity equilibrium disappears and only the
low trading intensity equilibrium survives (parameter values: v = u = n =  = 1
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a1
Figure 4: Di erently from the market with long-term traders, with short-term traders
a over- (under-) reliance on public information occurs in a thin (thick) market (pa-
rameter values:  v =  u =   n =   = 1 and   = .6; a 
1 = 0.732, a  
1 = 5.393).
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Figure 4: Dierently from the market with long-term traders, with short-term traders
a over- (under-) reliance on public information occurs in a thin (thick) market (pa-
rameter values: v = u = n =  = 1 and  = :6; a
1 = 0:732, a
1 = 5:393).
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